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10 CLASSIC LABOUR MARKET DISCRIMINATION
Anna Lovász & Bori Simonovits
The simplest definition of labour market discrimination is the following: mem-
bers of a certain group receive unequal treatment – for example, during re-
cruitment, wage setting, or promotion – compared to another group, and this 
differentiation is not based on their productivity but on their membership 
in the particular group (for example based on gender, age, ethnicity) (Arrow, 
1998, Loury, 2002). As a result of discrimination in the labour market, the 
members of the disadvantaged group may have, on average, a lower employ-
ment rate, occupational level, and wage.
In addition to their productive characteristics, the labour market situation of 
employees also depends on their individual preferences. This determines which 
jobs they apply for given their level of human capital, how much time they 
spend working, and how much effort they put into getting promoted. The main 
difficulty of measuring discrimination empirically is that the actual productiv-
ity and preferences of individuals are rarely observed. This makes it difficult 
to establish to what extent any observed mean differences in wages and other 
outcomes at the group level are a consequence of discrimination, and to what 
extent are they due to the different characteristics and preferences of the groups.
Characteristics and preferences seen in the labour market are also influenced 
by discrimination prior to entering the labour market (for example, when 
teachers or parents discourage girls from choosing certain areas of study). Pre-
labor market differences ingroup-level characteristics may be further increased 
by the expectations of the discriminated group: they may invest relatively less 
in their human capital if the expected returns in the labour market are smaller. 
Discrimination should therefore be regarded as a cumulative process, often 
manifesting in more than one area (Blank et al. 2004).
The situation in Hungary
In view of the above theoretical considerations, we assess the available data 
sources in order to analyse the extent of labour market discrimination against 
women in Hungary. First, using the 2016 Wage Survey, various specifications 
of the gender wage gap are estimated. Next, the occurrence of discrimina-
tion is described using the limited labour market discrimination tests, data 
on the legal cases brought in front of the Equal Treatment Authority (ETA), 
and population surveys on the perception of labour market discrimination.
Gender wage gap estimates
Public and political discourse often cites the gender wage gap as evidence of 
discrimination against women. However, when interpreting any wage differ-
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ences, it is important to be aware of what they actually measure – and what 
they don’t. We estimated the gender wage gap in the private sector using data 
from the Wage Survey (Table 10.1). The estimated wage equations contain the 
logarithm of wage as the dependent variable, and the unexplained (residual) 
wage difference is represented by the coefficient of the female dummy variable. 
The advantage of relying on an administrative database is that it is representa-
tive; however, due to unobserved differences (for example, ability or motiva-
tion) these estimates do not precisely measure discrimination.
Table 10.1: Gender wage gap estimates, private sector
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
logarithm of 
monthly wages logarithm of hourly pay
Female coefficient –0.136*** –0.093*** –0.130*** –0.123*** –0.092***
Control variables
Educational attainment x x x
Experience x x
Region x x
Type of employment contract x x
Occupation x
Number of observations 159,752 159,753 159,753 159,753 159,753
R2 0.010 0.006 0.285 0.332 0.379
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
Source: Authors’ wage equation estimates based on the 2016 Wage Survey.
The model in column (1) of Table 10.1 shows the raw average wage gap in 
monthly wages. The estimated coefficient is 0.136, thus women’s pay is 13.6 per 
cent lower than that of men. The monthly wage gap is partly due to the fewer 
hours women work. Therefore the hourly wage gap presented in model (2) is 
closer to the extent of labour market discrimination, and shows a smaller dif-
ference of about 9 per cent. Model (3) controls for the effect of gender differ-
ences in educational attainment on the wage gap. Accounting for these, the 
wage gap increases to 13 per cent, showing that women have higher educa-
tional attainment on average, and if this is also taken into account, their wage 
disadvantage is greater. We should note that so far as differences in educa-
tional attainment depend on innate skills and preferences, it is important to 
control for them, since the resulting wage differences are not due to labour 
discrimination. At the same time, by including education-related control 
variables, we restrict the estimation to the short-term impact of labour dis-
crimination, and exclude the impact of any pre-labor market discrimination.
Model (4) controls for additional observed individual characteristics:1 work 
experience, region, and the type of employment contract. When work expe-
rience is controlled for, the impact of child-related labor market absences – 
whether they are a result of individual preferences or external pressure – are 
also eliminated. The estimated wage gap barely changes after including these 
1 The control variables were in-
cluded in order to account for 
the effects of dissimilar charac-
teristics, but at the same time, 
the effects of any discrimina-
tion that occurs through these 
variables are also excluded from 
the estimated wage gap.
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controls: it decreases to 12 per cent. Model (5) additionally controls for oc-
cupation (based on the first digit of the HSCO code) and the unexplained 
wage gap is reduced to 9 per cent. However, we do not know, to what extent 
the part controlled for by the inclusion of occupation variables is due to the 
individual preferences of women (for example they do not wish to work in 
better paid but more stressful positions), and to what extent it is due to dis-
crimination by employers (for example, women are not hired or promoted 
into certain types of occupations). Therefore, this estimation may underesti-
mate the extent of labour market discrimination.
Discrimination testing and legal cases
Labour market discrimination testing, which is increasingly popular in the 
United States and in Western Europe (see Bertrand–Duflo, 2016), is able to 
measure the extent of employers’ discrimination present in an area more pre-
cisely, because it is based on controlled experiments. The limitations of the 
method include the fact that the results come from a small sample and thus 
are not representative, that it usually provides information only on the first 
phase (application) of finding a job, and also that it is costly and therefore 
rarely used. In Hungary, the last comprehensive testing of the differences in 
the opportunities for entering the labour market (by sending CV-s and apply-
ing via the phone) took place in 2008 (see Sik–Simonovits, 2008). The extent 
of rejection due to gender was measured in the occupations of shop assistant, 
bartender/catering staff, cleaner, courier, and telemarketers via telephone ap-
plications, and the study pointed to the (approximately 20 percent) disadvan-
tage of men in these positions. The fact that employers prefer hiring women for 
certain jobs suggests that the occupational segregation revealed by the above 
wage gap estimation is not exclusively due to the preferences of employees.
The results of legal cases can also confirm the presence of discrimination 
in individual cases. These findings cannot be generalised, because the official 
statistics available only show ‘the tip of the iceberg’. Adopting the equal treat-
ment and equal opportunities laws2 in accordance with European directives 
was a precondition to the EU accession of Hungary. The institutional system 
for enforcing the laws is ensured by the Equal Treatment Authority (ETA), 
established in February 2005. The legal cases of discrimination reported in 
a given year are available on the ETA website,3 and based on this, the num-
ber of cases investigated and the number of decisions on gender discrimina-
tion seem very low: in 2018 the ETA found infringement in only 10 cases out 
of a total of 24 cases investigated, and a settlement was reached in 14 cases.
Perception of labour market discrimination
Questionnaires on the perception of discrimination provide representative 
information on the perceptions of the population, but it is questionable how 
2 Act CXXV of 2003 of Equal 
treatment and the promotion of 
equal opportunities.
3 ETA.
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precisely they measure the actual extent of discrimination. Opinions on these 
offences are highly dependent on individual factors (sensitiveness, judgement 
of the situation) as well as the legislation and culture of the given country (if 
it is a matter of shame or it is acknowledged) (Sik–Simonovits, 2010). The 
database of the European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE)4 shows that, 
based on responses to the Eurobarometer questionnaire, a relatively high share 
of Hungarians (12.5 per cent) think that discrimination against women is 
a significant problem: this is the 4th highest share among EU member states.
A comprehensive survey titled ‘Women’s affairs 2018’ was recently carried 
out regarding how Hungarian women feel about the division of labour in the 
family and labour market participation (Gregor–Kováts, 2018). The survey 
– conducted at the end of 2017 – showed that the four major groups of prob-
lems affecting the lives of Hungarian women are the following: 1) being a sin-
gle parent, 2) raising a permanently ill child, 3) the expenses of raising a child, 
and 4) the low pay for part time work. Lower-status women were especially 
likely to report work and subsistence related problems, while gender-specific 
problems (such as the conflict between work and family life, the difficulties 
of returning to the labour market following maternal leave) were primarily 
reported by higher status women. This trend also reveals the hidden problems 
of perception surveys. Discrimination in a wider sense – including unequal 
treatment and the lack of appreciation – accounted for nearly one-tenth (9 
per cent) of the total gender-specific problems reported (N = 688); discrimi-
nation was spontaneously reported by nearly every fifth female respondent 
(19 per cent) in the 50–59 age group.
Conclusions
Labour market discrimination against women is difficult to prove and to 
measure. Results based on different methods indicate a certain level of la-
bour discrimination against women exists in Hungary; however, the disad-
vantage caused by this is difficult to quantify precisely. Estimates based on 
the Wage Surveys reveal an unexplained gender wage gap of about 0.09–0.13. 
The scarce available testing results point to occupational segregation and the 
related preferences of employers. The small number of legal cases suggests that 
rights awareness and demand for legal remedies are weak in the society. Per-
ception surveys indicate that various forms of discrimination against women 
are present in the labour market and other areas of social life, and the prob-
lem is the most severe among older women.
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K10.1 Labour market discrimination, 1995–2016
Gábor Kőrösi 
The wage survey data is available annually since the 
1990’s in a mostly comparable structure. Thus, the 
wage model can be estimated for two decades with 
a slight modification. It is eminently interesting 
how the gender wage gap changed over this period. 
A model very similar to Model 4 in Table 10.1 was 
estimated for the period between 1995 and 2016. 
The labour contract type had to be omitted from 
the regression. Figure K.10.1 presents these esti-
mates, together with the raw wage gap.
The gender wage gap declined until 2006, and 
stagnated afterwards. It is clear that the raw wage 
gap was not only smaller than the true discrimina-
tion, measured in a wage model, but the ‘true’ dis-
crimination decreased less than one would guess 
from the raw gender wage gap.1 Figure K.10.1 also 
presents the difference in the gender specific me-
dian wages: the difference between a ‘typical’ fe-
male and a ‘typical’ male employee is significant-
ly smaller than the average difference, indicating 
that the two wage distributions are different. That 
also means that the gender wage gap is not uni-
form for all.
1 The raw gender wage gap is given by Model 1 in Ta-
ble 10.1.
Figure K.10.1: Gender wage gap, hourly wage rate, corporate sector (percentages)
